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The War on Terror
The current ‘war on terror’ is being waged by a coalition led by the USA and it is surrounded by rhetoric and political influences. In order to ‘win’ such a war, one must cut through rhetoric, political and religious ideologies to understand the situation as it is ‘on the ground’. The nature of the ‘enemy’ and the resources available to them must be known in order to combat them. This becomes even more important when the enemy consists of non-state actors which have the ability to move and act in a relatively undetectable manner. Only then can one develop and implement strategies that will accomplish the expressed aims of a ‘war on terror’. With insidious adversaries consisting of individuals, small groups or global networks, direct physical combat becomes almost impossible. As such, the main course of action must be to identify the resources that can be addressed in order to reduce the terrorists’ capabilities. These resources are not only physical – finances, arms, personnel – but also more abstract – opportunity, possible impact, ability to succeed politically. It is through this process that one can realise the best possible way to fight the ‘war on terror’.
What is the War?
To fight what President George W Bush has termed a ‘war on terror’ one must first understand what that war entails. The most recent ‘war on terror’ was proclaimed by US President George W Bush on the 20th of September 2001, nine days after al Qaeda terrorist attacks in America killed 2,973 (AP 2006). When analysed from an academic standpoint the phrase ‘war on terror’ is misleading on a number of levels. Firstly, on a grammatical level, ‘terror’ is an abstract noun which describes an emotion; it is obvious that the states united in this war are fighting something more specific than an emotion. We can therefore assume that ‘terror’ is being used as a synecdochic metaphor for the method and effects of ‘terrorism’. However, war cannot be fought against a method, so one can assume that the war is actually against practitioners of terrorism and those who support them (Colonel Martin, J. 2002 p.7).
Though the current US administration has fought the ‘war on terror’ through more conventional wars against Afganistan and Iraq, the actual war on terrorism is an ‘irregular conflict’ (Miles 2006). In this form of warfare the targets are terrorist networks, insurgents and other non-state enemies. Bush outlined the scope of the war in his state of the union address, “Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated“ (Bush 2001). Despite the broadness of the ‘war on terror’, it actually denotes a ‘war’ on terrorists and those who support terrorists, specifically Islamist terrorists targeting the west. As stated in the September 2006 US Government National Stratergy for Combating Terrorism, a victory in the ‘war on terror’ would involve: “The defeat of violent extremism as a threat to our [the USA’s] way of life as a free and open society” and “The creation of a global environment inhospitable to violent extremists and all who support them.” (NSCT 2006, p.12)
The Terrorists
As with all wars, the ‘war on terror’ should be fought with a concrete understanding of the size, capacity and nature of the enemy. The enemy are those who use violent extremism as a threat to the USA’s democratic society, these have been branded by the US government as terrorists or terrorist groups (NSCT 2006, p.12). A complete list of over 105 pages of such entities and individuals is identified under Executive Order 13224 (US Gov 2007). The list includes groups as diverse as Al Qaida/Islamic Army, the Irish Republican Army and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. With such a broad range of enemies with different reasons for engagement, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism outlined a correspondingly broad solution: “We will attack terrorism and its ideology, and bring hope and freedom to the people of the world. This is how we will win the War on Terror.” (NSCT 2006, p.28)
Why Terrorise?
If the ideology of terrorism is to be combated then one must understand the rational behind it. The UN defines terrorism thusly:
“…any action constitutes terrorism if it is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a Government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act.” (UN 2005, p.27) With this in mind it is essential to understand what it is that organisations such as al Qaeda seek to accomplish. Thus we can understand what it is that would constitute the terrorists ‘winning’ the war. Adam Curtis examines the root of these organisations and their philosophies which aim to spur the global Arab/Muslim umma into revolution in order to promote Islamism (Curtis 2005). It is possible that the main purpose of the 2001 and 2005 terrorist attacks was to create a rift between western and Muslim cultures in order to position Islamism as a rallying point for the Muslim cause. This view is given credence when one views the symbolic nature of the targets of the 2001 attacks; The World Trade Centre, a symbol of western economic power; The Pentagon, a symbol of American military might; and the White House, a symbol of American political power. Refering to the power and symbolism of the 2001 attack German composer Karlheinz Stockhausen described it as ‘the greatest work of art ever’ (Shahid Alam, M. 2004, P. 127). Professor Michael Doran theorises thus:
“Osama bin Laden's attacks on the United States were aimed at another audience: the entire Muslim world… War with America was never his end; it was just a means to promote radical Islam.” (Doran 2001, p.1) In addition to preventing terrorist attacks the ‘war on terror’ should also aim to minimise the chance of success of any previous or future terrorist attack.
Terrorists are insidious by their very nature and it is thus impossible to wage a war directly upon these individuals. The two largest recent terrorist attacks on the west, the 2005 London bombing and the 2001 American attacks, where carried out by a diverse range of people originating and operating from numerous locations. The London attackers included ‘three young men aged 18, 22 and 30, all from West Yorkshire’ (Campbell D. / Laville S. 2005). While these British terrorists were ‘home-grown’, those who carried out the 2001 attacks came from Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates with coordination coming from as far a field as Hamburg, Germany (FBI 2001). Terrorists can be motivated by religion, desperation or money. They can come from any class, have any level of education or come from any social background. International terrorism does not know national borders and can be organized from anywhere to attack anywhere. Successful terrorists can be almost impossible to identify and there is no profile for who is a ‘likely’ terrorist, other than he tends to be male (Gupta 2005, p. 16) (Freedman 2002, p. 27) (Lelyveld, J 2001). This perhaps explains that, despite significant expansions in their powers since 2001, federal US agencies have not discovered a single terrorist cell. There have, however, been many arrests and claims, yet all charges have been quietly dropped as they turned out to be baseless assumptions (Lustick 2006, p. 40). Without the possibility for a direct strike against actual purveyors and perpetrators of terrorism, other ways of fighting the war must be found.
The Terrorist Toolkit
If one cannot pursue individual terrorists with a high success rate then one must stifle their resources. One of the reasons that terrorism has always been so pervasive throughout history is that it requires relatively few and low cost resources. These include physical resources, such as weaponry, safe havens, financial support and personnel. However, as the 2001 attacks showed, weaponry and financial support are not required in great quantities to carry our damaging attacks. Box cutters were used by just 19 men and very few co-conspirators to transform commercial airlines into devastating missiles. Pursuing these resources is worthwhile and has prevented attacks, however to focus solely on stifling these physical resources is costly and cannot be 100% effective. Richard Clarke, former White House counter-terrorism expert under President Regan, Clinton and both Bushes believes that this approach and conduct of the subsequent war in Iraq shows that ‘they [The US Government] are really not thinking conceptually about the war on terrorism’ (Corera 2004). As well as attacking these physical resources one must consider resources such as opportunity, potential to achieve success, and what fuels the extreme ideology that motivates attackers.
Opportunity
For a terrorism to be successful an attacker needs to have the opportunity to attack. While Britain, France, Spain, Italy and Singapore have been successful in breaking up would-be terrorist groups, the US has not detected a single domestic threat since 2001 and has failed to cooperate multilaterally with other countries on a global scale (Kellner 2002, p.20). Unilateralism and flouting international law in Guantanamo bay and Iraq, and sovereign law in several European countries, has alienated the US from both European and Arab allies (Kellner 2002, p.3) (Brown, S., Stewart, P. 2007, p.1). On the domestic front, financial deregulation and feuds between government departments have hampered efforts to detect terrorism (Kellner 2002, p.21). The 9/11 Commission identified a lack of domestic departmental cooperation as a contributing factor to the failure to prevent the 2001 attacks (9/11 Commission Report 2004, p.408). In order to better protect society against terrorism better international cooperation and indeed domestic integration is required. This would allow better scrutiny of global financial transactions and the sharing of intelligence.
How to make a Terrorist
To carry out successful attacks a terrorist organisation requires commited individuals who are strongly motivated. One can combat terrorism by addressing the ideological arguments that allow terrorist organisations to recruit members. The current ‘war on terror’ centers on Muslim extremists who have emerged from their western homelands or foreign countries. UK think tank ‘DEMOS’ published a report arguing that one thing missing from the ‘war on terror’ was involvement and engagement with domestic Muslim communities which have been overlooked as key allies:
“Muslim communities suffer some of the worst indicators of deprivation, discrimination and social exclusion, and many are deeply unhappy about aspects of the government’s foreign policy towards the Islamic world, which they feel constitutes a ‘war on Islam’. Cheap international travel, satellite television and continuing links to family and friends in countries of origin provide a vital bridge between these personal and global grievances.” (DEMOS 2006, p.13) The paper argues that involvement and integration between mainstream society and Muslim communities will reduce the threat of ‘home-grown’ terrorism. That is, one will be less likely to be influenced by radical ideologies that rage against their society if they indeed feel a part of it. If, as stated above, the aim of terrorists is to encourage separatism and revolution, then unity and integration form a direct challenge. To fight the ‘war on terror’ domestically the motivation to join a terrorist cause must be reduced and this means programs, policy and political language that promote integration rather than divisiveness.
Good vs Evil
The motivation of foreign terrorists can also be reduced if one is able to accurately understand and judge what it is. Ideologies and religion mask the real reasons which motivate those who attack the West. It is easy to blame religious extremism and ideologies as it offers a clear ‘good vs evil’ paradigm which is simplifies the matter, however, those in the field of counter-terrorism rarely use such simplistic explanations. Former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit Mike Scheuer:
“Bin Laden is attacking us because a specific set of US policies that have been in gear for 30 years and haven't been reviewed, haven't been debated, haven't been questioned.” (Corera 2004) Scheuer is referring to policies such as the US’s support for Israel, their presence on the Arab peninsula and perceived oppression of Muslims (Corera 2004). Provocative military interventions and military support should be considered in terms of the potential terrorist risk. This may not lead to the halting of such interventions, however it may highlight the need for multilateral support that combines military, police, humanitarian, and reconstruction aid.
What the Hell are We Doing?
Many are concerned that the current reaction by the West and the Coalition of the Willing are merely perpetuating and amplifying these policies. Thus the West’s current response can be seen as largely been counterproductive. DEMOS argues the point on a domestic scale in the UK:
“The government’s response to terrorism is alienating the very communities it needs to engage, and that their growing sense of grievance, anger and injustice inadvertently legitimises the terrorists’ aims, with or without their active consent.” (DEMOS 2006, p.14) While others, such as Professor Douglas Kellner, argure the same point on an international scale:
“[The West’s military response] has hindered more intelligent and potentially successful efforts against terror networks, while quite possibly creating more terrorists and enemies of the United States.” (Kellner 2002, p.2) Anger in the Muslim world over injustices suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan, including civilian deaths, torture and a perceived ‘war on islam’ become a powerful new recruiting tool for the terrorist cause. Richard Clarke believes that the West’s overreaction has inspired support for terrorist organisations which were initially in decline after the 2001 attacks.
“People who are mad at the US for what we've done in Iraq and elsewhere are probably organising new networks we don't know about. But if that's true they'll probably be a lull between the time when the old al Qaeda is destroyed and the new one appears.” (Corera 2004) The aim of terrorism is not to inflict damage or create fear and panic, it is to use these as tools to spark political change. The aim of revolutionaries such as Usama Bin Laden is to create an uprising by creating a cultural rift and recruiting others to their cause (Doran, S. 2002, p.1) (Curtis, A., 2004). They require their enemy to be provoked into action which in turn provokes others and creates a conflict which may or may not result in their victory. By keeping responses to terrorism rational and proportionate with the explicit aim of not antagonizing others, the victims of terrorism can render attacks ineffectual.
In Conclusion
Ultimately the ‘war on terror’ is a fallacy and war based on a fallacy can never be won or even fought. Due to the insidious, low cost and timeless nature on terrorism, one can never completely be assured of its eradication; however the threat can be minimized. Terrorist attacks can be thwarted through intelligence gathering, however this requires both domestic and international departmental and governmental integration for the best chance of success. Well-planned military strikes can be effective, however large scale attacks can merely provoke enemies and be counterproductive. The motivations and ideologies for terrorist attacks must also be understood and can in turn be combated. Domestic terrorism can be reduced through social inclusiveness and cultural integration and improving the image of a nation through dialogue and action reduces its position as an international target. Moreover, for any terrorism to be successful in its political aims it requires the engagement of the opposition in order to legitimise their political claims. By treating an attack as a crime and not overreacting to risk, terrorism can never be a successful political tool.
How Do I Know This?
Adam Curtis, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/4202741.stm, 2005, 7pm April 4th 2007, BBC
Associated Press (AP), Death Toll in Iraq and Afghanistan Now Tops 9/11, September 22nd 2006, Associated Press
BBC, Power of Nightmares re-awakened, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4034833.stm, 6:30pm March 30th 2007, BBC
Bjørgo, T., Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward, 2005, Routledge
Briggs, R., Fieschi, C., Lownsbrough, H., Bringing it Home - Community-based approaches to counter-terrorism, 2006, DEMOS
Brown, S. , Stewart, P., Italy hopes to mend ties after CIA indictments, March 19th 2007, http://today.reuters.com/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldnews&storyID=2007-03-19T160137Z_01_L19562584_RTRUKOC_0_US-ITALY-USA.xml, 9pm April 9th 2007, Reuters
Colonel Martin, J. (ed), Defeating Terrorism: Strategic Issue Analyses 2002, DIANE Publishing
Corera, G., War on terror 'vanishes from agenda', http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4034833.stm, 2004, 7:30pm March 31st 2007, BBC
Doran, S., Somebody Else's Civil War, from the January/February 2002 Foreign Affairs Journal, 2002, Council on Foreign Relations
Dyer, C., ‘There is no war on terror’, politics.guardian.co.uk/terrorism/story/0,,1997247,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=1, 2007, 4pm April 1st 2007
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Press Release: The FBI releases 19 photographs of individuals believed to be the hijackers of the four airliners that crashed on September 11, 01, 27th September 2001, FBI
Freedman, L., Superterrorism: Policy Responses, 2002, Blackwell Publishing
G.W. Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, September 20th 2001, White House
Kellner, D., September 11 and Terror War: The Bush Legacy and the Risks of Unilateralism, 2002
Lelyveld, J., All Suicide Bombers Are Not Alike, October 28 2001, New York Times
Lustick, I., Trapped in the War on Terror, 2006, University of Pennsylvania Press
Miles D., Army Experts: Unconventional Conflicts to Dominate Future Operations, October 12th 2006, American Forces Press Service
Shahid Alam, M.,Is There an Islamic Problem?: Essays on Islamic Societies, the US and Israel, 2004, The Other Press
United Nations (UN) General Assembly, Fifty-ninth session, Agenda items 45 and 55, 21st March 2005, UN
US Government, 9/11 Commission Report, 2004, US Government
US Government, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), September 2006, US Government
